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ARGUMENT
HUNAN DID NOT ESTABLISH ANY EXTRAORDINARY
FACTS AT TRIAL
In its brief, Hunan1 does not appear to dispute the general rule that if reasonable
attorneys' fees "are recoverable by statute or contract, it is a mistake of law to award less than
that amount." See Saunders v. Sharp, 818 P.2d 574, 579 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); see also
Cobabe v. Crawford, 780 P.2d 834, 836 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). Instead, Hunan relies on
Fullmer v. Blood, 546 P.2d 606 (Utah 1976), claiming that the case at bar merits an exception
from the general rule, thereby precluding an award of attorneys' fees. However, Fullmer is
distinguishable in several important characteristics and cannot be a basis to uphold the ruling
of the district court.
First, in this case, unlike in Fullmer, in this case there is a statute that mandates an
award of fees "if they are provided for in the lease or agreement." See Utah Code Ann. § 78B6-811 (formerly codified at Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-10(3)). When a statute mandates an
award of fees, a district court must award fees.
Second, the language of the attorneys' fees clause in Fullmer is substantively different
from the language of the attorneys' fees clause in this case. The attorneys' fees provision at
issue in the case at bar is based on who the prevailing party is, while in Fullmer the attorneys'
fees provision was based on who the defaulting party was, stating "that in case of default the
defaulting party shall pay costs and expenses, including a reasonable attorney's fee incurred

1

Plaintiff/Appellee/Cross-Appellant Red Cliffs Corner shall be referred to as "RCC."
Defendants/Appellants/Cross-Appellees J.J. Hunan, Inc., and R. Alan Knox shall be referred
to collectively as "Hunan."
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in enforcing the agreement, or in pursuing any remedy with respect to the property." Id. at 610
(emphasis added). On the other hand, paragraph 40, subsection T, of the lease between the
parties (Exhibit 1 to appellant's opening brief, Bates-stamped page RCC-00044) states "in the
event either party brings or commences a legal proceeding to enforce any of the terms of this
Agreement, the prevailing party in such action shall have the right to recover reasonable
attorney's fees and costs from the other party, to be fixed by the court in the same action"
(emphasis added). In Cobabe, this Court analyzed the attorney's fee provision at issue there,
which was "a provision of the sales contract which awards attorney fees to the 'successful
party' in connection with litigation to enforce any provision or rights under the contract." See
Cobabe 780 P.2d at 836. In that case, the issue was whether there was a prevailing party. This
Court in Cobabe identified the general rule regarding attorney's fees, stating "[furthermore,
contrary to [the] contention that attorney's fees should be determined on the basis of an
equitable standard, attorney's fees, when awarded as allowed by law, are awarded as a matter
of legal right." Id. It then identified the extraordinary exception found in Fullmer.
Furthermore, the case relied by the district court in the case at hand, A.K. & R. Whipple
Plumbing and Heating v. Guy, 2002 UT App 73, 47 P.3d 92, was also a case evaluating an
attorneys' fee provision that provided that the successful or prevailing party would be entitled
to recover its reasonable attorney's fees. See id. at \9. Both Cobabe and Whipple refused to
follow Fullmer, although noting its existence, and both cases also dealt with a prevailing party
clause and not the defaulting party clause found in Fullmer. Likewise, in the case at hand, the
lease contains a prevailing party attorneys' fee provision. Therefore, it is distinguishable from
the Fullmer case and analysis. One of the extraordinary aspects of Fullmer is the fact that its
864666v3
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attorneys5 fee provision is an unusual one involving a determination of who the defaulting
party is as opposed to who prevailed in the litigation.
Third, the court in Fullmer found that the plaintiff in that case had, in effect, received
a windfall of $12,150 which was forfeited by the defendant. Despite Hunan's creative
arguments to the contrary,2 this case does not involve any windfall. Nowhere does the district
court make a finding that RCC benefitted from the tenant improvements made by Hunan.
Regardless of Hunan's arguing at trial that there had been a windfall, such arguments were
only part of what was before the district court. The district court refused to accept Hunan's
argument. Therefore, the case at hand is distinguishable from Fullmer.
Fourth, "significant" to the court's decision in Fullmer was that the plaintiff did not
prevail on one of its main claims. See Fullmer, 546 P.2d at 610. In Fullmer, the plaintiff had
a main cause of action for fraudulent transfer, as one of the partners transferred its interest to
a relative. The Fullmer trial court concluded that the evidence did not support a finding of
fraud. Because the plaintiff did not prevail on one of its main claims, the court in that case
was less inclined to award fees. In the case at bar, by contrast, RCC prevailed in all of its
claims, and Hunan did not prevail on any of its defenses or counterclaim. This argument was
already set forth in greater detail in RCC's principal brief.

2

Although Hunan makes numerous references to "$58,405.36" of improvements, nowhere
in the Findings of Fact did the district court ever state that Hunan performed, let alone had
forfeited, $58,405.36 of improvements. There is no finding of fact using the number
"$58,405.36." For Hunan to use such a number in its opposition and claim that the district
court ordered this amount forfeited is disingenuous at best.
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Fifth, there is also the difference between the instant case and Fullmer regarding the
equitable considerations. The Fullmer court observed that, because of the forfeiture "and/or
enforcement of a purchase contract," principles of equity came into play that would support
the conclusion that extraordinary circumstances existed. See Fullmer•, 546 P.2d at 610. In the
case at hand, the district court found against Hunan's offset claims even if the equitable
doctrine of waiver was not involved. In other words, the equitable analysis was not only not
the driving force of the district court's ruling, but equitable considerations could be removed
from the analysis altogether without changing the outcome. The district court concluded that
Hunan's claim for offset and its counterclaim necessarily failed because it did not have any
evidence to prove its claim for offset and damages as required by law:
Even if Hunan had not waived the claims it raises in its counterclaim, its
counterclaim must fail because Hunan failed to properly establish its damages.
The party seeking damages has the burden of proving the fact, causation, and
amount of damages and must do so with reasonable certainty and not by
speculation or guesswork. See Price-Orem Investment Co. v. Rollins, Brown
andGunnell Inc., 784P.2d475,478 (Ut.Ct.App. 1989) (citing Canyon Country
Store v. Bracey, 781 P.2d 414, 418 (Utah 1989)).
R. 373 f 46. After concluding that RCC had proven its damages with specificity, the district
court further stated as follows:
On the other hand, Hunan failed to provide such specificity. Mr. Funk testified
that he did not break down the cost of the sheet rock for the bathroom from the
overall cost of the tenant improvements. Mr. Funk also testified that he did not
break down the various electrical costs for wiring the entire Premises, outlets,
switches, cooking facilities, and lay in lights. There was no evidence in the
form of invoices specific to the items Hunan claims should have been performed
by RCC, nor did Mr. Funk testify that he was requested to create any. Rather,
Mr. Funk testified that he had not been told that RCC would be paying for any
of the work he was doing. Mr. Funk was not hired by RCC, nor did RCC direct
any of his work. Furthermore, Hunan claims that RCC should pay for its entire
864666v3
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cost of its bathroom when the Lease only required RCC to provide a minimal
bathroom that was sufficient to meet code, not an elaborate bathroom with
cobblestone on the walls, fully walled in bathroom stalls, and other upgrades.
On cross examination, Mr. Funk admitted that these upgrades were not required
for the bathroom to meet code.
R. 374 Tj 49. These conclusions show that Hunan did not have any evidence or substance to
support its claim. This is not an issue of equity. Hunan could not establish any actual
damages and, therefore, it could not establish any real offset or forfeiture.
The real driving issue to the trial court in the case at hand appears to be the fact that
significant treble damages had been awarded. There is no case law to support the district court
in its determination that, where significant treble damages are awarded by statute, attorneys'
fees should not be awarded.
Furthermore, the fact that treble damages amounted to over $50,000.00 should not be
alarming to this or any other court. That treble damages are provided in the statute would
seem to create an incentive for a tenant to vacate the premises quickly once it begins
unlawfully detaining the premises to avoid greater damages. If a tenant makes a choice to
ignore the statutory remedy and continue to unlawfully detain the premises, then it alone
should bear the risk that its continued unlawful detainer may result in significant treble
damages. If a landlord is deemed to forfeit its contractual attorneys' fees provision because
there are significant treble damages caused by a tenant that unlawfully detains a property for
an extended time, this would force the landlord to share the risk against the will of the landlord
and would encourage a tenant to stay rather than vacate. Such an outcome defeats the
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incentive and purpose of treble damages and improperly rewrites the contract between the
parties.3
In the case at hand, RCC pursued its claim of unlawful detainer vigorously and did not
delay in seeking an order of restitution which ended the unlawful detainer. RCC did not act
in any way to delay the process or increase the amount of treble damages that would later be
awarded. Rather, it was Hunan that delayed moving out. Hunan took the risk of its own
evaluation of the law and circumstances and continued to unlawfully detain the premises for
over two months. Hunan now seeks to escape the consequences of the risk it took by not
vacating the premises and shift this risk to RCC. This Court should reject such efforts by
Hunan and reverse the district court on the issue of attorneys' fees and remand for the
calculation and determination of the amount of attorneys' fees incurred in this matter.
Fullmer was an extraordinary case. The several unique factors discussed above set it
apart from other cases, including setting it apart from the instant case. Fullmer involved an
uncommon defaulting party attorney's fee provision. The trial court in Fullmer ruled against
the plaintiff in one of plaintiff s main claims. The Fullmer trial court found that there was an
amount proven as forfeited by the defendant to the plaintiff. The Fullmer court determined
that there were key equitable principles involved in the underlying case. Fullmer had
complicated facts where both parties had received their interest by assignment, disputed the
effects of a purported partnership buyout agreement, and one of the parties had purchased the

3

"[A] court may not make a better contract for the parties than they have made for
themselves; furthermore, a court may not enforce asserted rights not supported by the contract
itself." See U.P.C., Inc. v. R.O.A Gen. Inc., 1999 UT App 303, U 41, 990 P.2d 945 (citations
omitted).
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note on which the partnership had defaulted. In the case at hand, none of these issues or
complexities exist and the result of Fullmer should not be applied here.
CONCLUSION
For all of the foregoing reasons, the district court's findings and conclusions should be
affirmed in their entirety, with one exception: the district court's decision to deny RCC
recovery of its attorneys' fees should be reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
DATED this 1 9 ^ day of November, 2008.

JONES WALDO HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH

A A Aneu^

fmi)

,By:
^Russell S^Mitchell
Attorneys far Plaintiff/Appellee/Cross-Appellant
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